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Abstract 
We propose a simple estimation method for parameters of the Burdett-Morten-
sen equilibrium search model. The method only uses wage data. It also applies 
if the parameters of the model vary within the population. As we show, such 
variation is essential for an acceptable fit to the observed wage distribution. We 
apply the method to wage data from a Dutch panel study. 
This research was sponsored by the Economics Research Foundation (ECO-
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allowed us to use the OSA panel. The research of Gerard van den Berg has 
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1. Introduction 
The equilibrium search model of Burdett and Mortensen (see e.g. Burdett and 
Mortensen (1993)) is beginning to have an impact on empirical work. The first 
applications are in Van den Berg and Ridder (1992) and Kiefer and Neumann 
(1992). In both papers individual labor market histories are used to estimate the 
simplest version of the Burdett-Mortensen (BM) model. The estimation method 
is maximum likelihood. 
The BM model gives explicit solutions for the equilibrium distributions of 
wages paid and wages offered. The distribution of wages paid or earnings 
refers to a cross-section of employees at a particular moment, and the distributi-
on of wages offered refers to the wage offers that (un)employed job seekers 
receive. In a steady state the earnings density is obtained by multiplying the 
density of wage offers by the number of workers employed at a particular 
wage. 
In the sequel we concentrate on the earnings and wage offer distributions as 
implied by the BM model. There are a number of reasons for a closer inspecti-
on of these distributions. Firstly, the shape of the equilibrium densities seems to 
preclude a good fit to data. In figure 1 we have plotted the distribution of 
wages in the homogeneous BM model for a priori plausible parameter values, 
and the observed distribution of wages paid (note that the scales differ). It is 
clear that the homogeneous BM model, i.e. the BM model in which all workers 
and employers are assumed to be identical, cannot describe the observed 
earnings distribution. Secondly, the expressions for the wage and earnings 
densities make estimation of their parameters difficult. The support of the 
distributions depends on the parameters of interest, and maximum likelihood 
estimation of the parameters is not Standard. 
As noted by Van den Berg and Ridder (1993), the fit can be improved by 
allowing for heterogeneity of the parameters that describe workers and employ-
ers, and indeed Van den Berg and Ridder (1992) find that in particular allowan-
ce for heterogeneity of the productivity of workers improves the fit substantial-
ly. The problems with maximum likelihood disappear if we assume that the 
wages are measured with error, and this is what we do in Van den Berg and 
Ridder (1992). 
In this paper we show that allowance for heterogeneity in the productivity of 
workers is the key to obtaining a good fit to the observed earnings distribution. 
Moreover, we can recover the productivity distribution from the earnings and 
wage offer distribution. Estimation of some other parameters of the BM model 
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is possible, but it turns out that the wage distributions are not very informative. 
It would require truly large samples to obtain accurate estimates of these other 
parameters. Because these parameters relate to transition intensities between 
labor market states, they can be estimated more accurately from panel data. The 
estimates of the parameters of the productivity distribution and of the other 
parameters are obtained by the method of moments. We use the estimates to 
decompose the earnings variance into a component due to the heterogeneity of 
the productivities and a component corresponding to the wage dispersion 
induced by the BM model. It turns out that the contribution of the productivity 
heterogeneity dominates. 
In section 2 we introducé the basic BM model. The estimation method is 
described in section 3. Section 4 contains the estimates and some implications 
of the estimates. 
2. The Homogeneous Equilibrium Search Model 
We make the foliowing assumptions: 
Al. There are continua of workers an firms with measures m and 1, 
respectively. 
A2. Workers receive job offers at rate Xo if unemployed and Xt if employed. 
A job offer is an i.i.d. draw from a wage offer distribution with cd.f. 
F(w>). An offer has to be accepted or rejected upon arrival. 
A3. Job-worker matches break up at rate ö. If this happens the worker beco-
mes unemployed. The level of unemployment benefits is b. 
A4. Firms have a linear production function and the average value product is 
p. A firm pays all its workers the same wage w. 
A5. Workers maximize their expected wealth, and firms maximize their 
steady-state profits. 
A6. The firms can not set their wage below the mandatory mimimum wage 
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Under these assumptions the optimal strategy of the unemployed is a 
reservation strategy with reservation wage r. The optimal strategy of the 
employed is to quit their current job with wage w for a better paying one. So 
the employed are assumed to climb a job ladder, on the way increasing their 
wage. However, there is a chance that an employed worker becomes unem-
ployed, and in that case he has to start again at the bottom of the ladder. 
Contrary to conventional job search models for the unemployed job search 
continues after acceptance of a wage offer. Hence, we refer to the strategy of 
the workers as repeated search. 
Each firm chooses a wage rate w, that maximizes its steady-state profit 
flow (p-w)l(w) with l(w) the workforce of a firm that sets its wage at w. The 
firm sets its wage knowing the wages set by other firms. Hence, it knows that 
setting a low wage means high profits per worker, but also high turnover and a 
small workforce, and the opposite holds if it sets a high wage. Because workers 
continue to search after acceptance of a job, there can not be a positive fraction 
of firms that pay a particular wage. Increasing the wage infinitesimally would 
increase the labor force much more than it would decrease the profit per 
worker, thereby increasing the total profit, so that the original wage was not 
profit maximizing. Because firms that set w equal to the reservation wage r of 
the unemployed have a nonzero workforce, and firms that offer a lower wage 
cannot survive, we have that r is the lower bound of the support of the wage 
offer distribution. Firms that offer r make positive profits, and as a consequen-
ce the profit rate of any firm is equal to the profit rate of the firms that offer r. 
Because setting the wage at p would imply zero profits, the upper bound of the 
support is strictly smaller than p. As argued before there cannot be a positive 
fraction of firms that offer this maximal wage w}. There cannot be gaps in the 
support of the wage offer distribution, because firms at the upper boundary of 
the gap can increase their profits by offering a wage at the lower boundary of 
the gap. 
We conclude that there exists a wage offer density with support [r,w7], 
The explicit solution for the wage offer density follows from the condition that 
all firms on the support have the same profit rate. Until now we have assumed 
that the mandatory minimum wage wL is smaller than r. If it exceeds r, then the 
lowest paying firm is the one that offers wL, and the equilibrium profit rate is 
the profit rate of this firm. Note that in both cases the unemployed accept the 
first job that is offered to them. 
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The equilibrium wage offer density is 
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(2.5)
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The upper bound of the support is a weighted average of the lowest wage and 
p, and hence strictly smaller thanp. Note also that the densities depend on XQ, 
\ and 8 only through XQ/Ö and \/8. 
In the homogeneous BM model all workers are equally productive and 
have the same arrival and lay-off rates. Moreover, the assumption that a firm 
4 
employs identical workers is not realistic. We should think of a firm in the BM 
model as a department within a firm, that is responsible for its own hiring and 
firing decisions. It is more realistic to assume that workers have different 
productivities and arrival/lay-off rates. Indeed, we shall assume that this 
heterogeneity can be described by a distribution of p and XQ/5, \lb over the 
workers. We also assume that for every triplet ip, X0/ö, \lb) there is a separate 
market, so that the equilibrium distributions are mixtures over these triplets. 
Next, we study the estimation of the parameters of such mixtures of homogene-
ous BM models. We refer to this model as the Mixture BM (MBM) model. 
3. Estimation of the Parameters of the Mixture Burdett-Mortensen Model 
We assume that we have a random sample of observations from the wage offer 
distribution with density (2.1) and from the earnings distribution with density 
(2.2). Observations from the wage offer distribution are obtained by recording 
the wages accepted by unemployed job seekers. We obtain observations from 
the earnings distribution by recording the wages of a cross-section of employ-
ees. 
In the homogeneous BM model maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of 
the parameters is not Standard. To see this note that the likelihood function 
based on either (2.1) or (2.2) becomes infinite, if we estimate p by the sample 
maximum. Because the sample maximum converges to Wj<p, this estimator of 
p is not consistent. The reason for this anomalous behaviour of the MLE is that 
the support of the wage offer and earning distributions depends on the parame-
ters of interest. As noted by Kiefer and Neumann (1992) this feature can be 
exploited to obtain consistent estimators of the parameters. They propose to use 
the sample minimum and maximum to estimate w0 and Wj. Substitution of these 
estimators in (2.4) and (2.5) gives us two equations that can be solved for p and 
b if we have estimates of XQ, XX and ö. Estimates of these parameters can be 
obtained from panel data that record labor market transitions. Indeed, Kiefer 
and Neumann derive the likelihood function for panel data. After substitution 
for p and b in (2.1) and (2.2) this function only depends on r)0, Xj and ö, and is 
a Standard likelihood. This method has two drawbacks. Because it is based on 
the sample minimum and maximum, the estimates are sensitive to measurement 
errors in the wages. Irrespective of the availability of panel data, the procedure 
also breaks down in the MBM model, because the lower and upper bounds of 
the support of the distributions are not given by (2.3)-(2.5) if the parameters 
follow some distribution. For instance, if the distribution of p does not have an 
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upper bound, so that w2 is infinite. As argued below, allowing for heterogeneity 
in p is essential for a good fit to wage data. 
An alternative procedure starts from the following transformation of w 
(3.1) y p - w 
P ~ % 
so that the excess wage w-w0 satisfies 
(3.2) w-w0 = (l-}0(p-wo) 
The density of y is for the wage offer distribution 
( 3
-
3 )
 fyW = n7T-^ym >* * y * l 
y
 2(1 -77) 
and for the earnings distribution 
(3-4) gfi) = ^—y~m rf <y <i 
y
 2(1 -7}) 
with 
(3.5)
 V = Ö+X i 
Equation (3.2) describes the wage determination in the BM model. The excess 
wage w-w0 is a fraction of the excess productivity p-w0. This fraction is a 
random variable with a distribution that depends on the expected number of 
wage offers during a spell of employment, i.e. a spell that starts with the 
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acceptance of a job from unemployment and ends with a lay-off. This number 
given by X^d is a measure of the speed at which the worker climbs the job (and 
wage) ladder. 
From these expressions we find the moments of the wage offer and 
earnings distributions. We obtain 
(3.6) Efw-wQy = (p-wQy ^—t \n}(-iyJ-a-v^) 2(l->7)*=0 
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n 
k k--
2 
In particular 
(3.8) Epv-w0) = (p-w0)(l--(T72+i7+l)) 
(3.9) EIW-WQ) = (p-w^il-rj) 
(3.10) V(w-w0) = (p-w^Ua-v)2 
We can use (3.8) and (3.9) to estimate the parameters of the homogene-
ous BM model, if we replace the population means on left-hand sides of these 
equations by sample means and if w0=wL. If we make assumptions BI and B2 
below then we can use the same approach in the MBM model. 
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BI. The productivity p varies in the population, but t] is constant in the 
population. 
B2. The lower bound w0 is equal to the mandatory minimum wage wL. 
Assumption BI seems arbitrary. However, the estimation results in Van den 
Berg and Ridder (1992) indicate that there is not much variation in Xj/5, but 
that the fit of the model improves dramatically if we allow for variation in p. 
Because r depends on the transition parameters and p, we require in assumption 
B2 that the inequality holds uniformly in these parameters. Again the estimation 
results in Van den Berg and Ridder (1992) indicate that this holds for workers 
younger than 39. For these workers wage offers are more frequent when 
employed, so that their reservation wage is lower than the benefit level b which 
in turn is lower than wL. 
Under assumptions BI and B2 (3.8) and (3.9) are linear 'mp. Hence, they 
also hold for the MBM model, if we interpret p as the mean in the population, 
Pm-
Hence, we can solve for t\ and pm 
(3.11) , =
 3
 E
'
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~
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(3.12) Pm = W0 + 
(Eo (w-wO) 2 
diE^w-Wf) -Epv-wJ) 
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If there is heterogeneity in p, then an obvious generalization of (3.10) can be 
solved for the variance of p 
V(p) = = 
Note that we did not make any assumption on the distribution of p. Under 
assumptions BI and B2 we can write the wage excess as the product of two 
random variables: 1-y that indicates the position of the worker on the job ladder 
and p-w0, the excess productivity of the selected worker. If we write the fïrst 
factor on the right-hand side of (3.7) as 
(3.14) E(p-Pmr + (pm-wy 
we see that we can match the moments of the observed earnings distribution by 
choosing appropriate values for the moments of p. Hence, the fit to observed 
wage data depends on the choice of the distribution of p, and (3.7) and (3.14) 
guide us in our choice of this distribution. 
Because 0 < 17< 1, we obtain from (3.11) 
(3.15) -Epv-wj > E^W-WQ) > Epv-w0) 
Hence, the MBM model implies a rather tight restriction on the mean offer and 
the mean earnings. In particular, the upper bound can be violated. It can be 
shown that allowing for variation in r\ increases the constant in the upper bound 
to at most 1.71. 
In the next section we shall use (3.11)-(3.13) to estimate the parameters 
of the MBM model. 
(3.13) 
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4. Estimates and Implications 
We use data on wage offers and earnings from the OSA Panel Survey. This 
panel started in 1985. Since then three more waves have become available (in 
1986, 1988, and 1990). We need only a fraction of the information. Specifical-
ly, we use the wage at the moment of the first wave of the individuals that were 
employed at that time, and accepted wages of unemployed workers who found a 
job in the period 1985-1990. All wages are in Dutch guilders per month. 
For the whole sample and the subsample that excludes individuals over 39 
with a higher vocational or university education we find 
All individuals 
Average excess earnings=691 Average excess accepted wage=307 
N=1905 N=44 
Excluding workers over 39 with higher education 
Average excess earnings=539 Average excess accepted wage=303 
N=1301 N=28 
First, one is struck by the small number of unemployed who found a job in the 
period of the survey. It is likely that this small group is a highly selective 
sample. This causes a problem if the sample is selective with respect to p. 
Secondly, in both samples the restriction (3.15) is violated. The average excess 
earnings are much too large relative to the average excess accepted wage. This 
is also true if we allow for heterogeneity in 17. 
An obvious explanation is that the sample of the re-employed is selective. If 
we compare the re-employed with the employed, then the re-employed are 
younger, lower educated, and have lower-level jobs. If we regress for the 
employed the earnings at the date of the first wave on a number of characteris-
tics we obtain the following estimates 
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Variable Coëfficiënt Standard error 
Constant 1126.7 50.2 
Education 
Basic 
Lower 124.8 31.9 
Intermed. 339.3 43.7 
Higher 696.9 68.8 
Age 
16-22 
23-29 378.9 49.9 
30-38 704.2 49.0 
39- 944.8 49.1 
Job level 
1 
2 87.5 35.4 
3 251.0 50.4 
4 606.8 47.3 
s 536.9 
R .46 
Given these estimates and the characteristics of the re-employed, it is not 
surprising that the average excess eamings of this selective group of re-employ-
ed workers is overestimated by the corresponding average of the employed. 
We use the regression results to predict the average excess earnings for the 
re-employed in the subsample defmed above. We impose the latter restriction to 
ensure that the mimimum wage exceeds the reservation wage. We obtain 
Predicted average excess eamings=442 
Note that we only correct for observed differences between the re-employed 
and other employees. If there are unobserved differences, then the estimate of 
the average excess earnings may be biased. This estimate implies 
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T;= .0566 _ i= 16.7 (228.1) 
ö 
The variance of the estimator of \/8 is obtained by the delta-method. The 
reported Standard error is very large, because it is based on a very small 
sample (28 observations), and because the variances of the earnings and wage 
offer distributions are large. For instance, if the sample size were N=5000, 
then the Standard error would still be 17.0. Hence the large Standard error 
reflects the fact that the wage data are not very informative on Xj/ö. The 
estimate for Xj/ö can be compared with the estimate 7.62 obtained for this 
subsample by Van den Berg and Ridder (1992). 
Because the estimation error in r\ is large, we give estimates of the other 
parameters based on (3.12) and (3.13), and estimates based on the same 
expressions but with 77 = .12 which is obtained from the transition data. 
Estimates as in (3.12) and (3.13) 
£„=1822.5 (260.7) (V(p))m = 120.0 Fraction due to p: .78 
Estimates based on y\=.12 
Pm = 1856.0 (147.1) (V(p))m = 105.3 Fraction due top: .53 
The Standard error of the estimator (3.12) is obtained by the delta-method. 
The fraction due to p is the fraction of the earnings variance due to the hetero-
geneity in p. For both estimates the heterogeneity is the main source of variati-
on. 
These results show that, although it is possible to estimate Xj/5 from cross-
section data on wages, the estimate is imprecise. The average productivity can 
be estimated more precisely. Hence, we clearly need panel data. With panel 
data the cross-section moment conditions of the present paper can be combined 
with the likelihood for the transition data. Such a procedure is attractive, 
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because it avoids the use of sample extremes and also does not require measure-
ment error to deal with the dependence of the support of the wage distributions 
on the parameters of interest. 
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Figure 1. Equilibrium eamings distribution (kj/b = 7.62, wL=1401, p=2073: 
averages of parameter estimates in Van den Berg and Ridder (1992)) and 
observed distribution of eamings. 
-co ' 500 600 9 0 0 2000 HOC 
14 
